China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China's carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state-market relationship.
Introduction
Over the past decade, carbon emission markets have risen to become the dominant form of institutions for climate change mitigation (Ellerman, Convery, & Perthuis, 2010; Grubb, 2012; Grubb, Laing, Counsell, & Willan, 2011; Mol, 2012; Pezzey & Jotzo, 2013; Spaargaren & Mol, 2013) . Global carbon trades recorded a soaring market value of US$176 billion in 2011 (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012, p. 10) . Approximately US$23 billion originated from the trading of secondary carbon offsets under the Kyoto Protocol's market mechanisms, notably the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Global carbon finance needs to be scaled up by an order of magnitude in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Some commentators see opportunities from outside the project-based CDM. Allowance-based market mechanisms may be able to engage emerging economies in ways similar to those which operate in Europe, i.e. the European Union's (EU) emission trading scheme (ETS) (Grubb, 2012; Perdan & Azapagic, 2011) .
Major Asian economies are taking up this trend, including Tokyo (Japan), South Korea, China, Kazakhstan, and India. China, the world's largest emerging market, is seen to have great potential for large-scale carbon trading (Fankhauser, 2011; Guan & Hubacek, 2010; Jotzo, De Boer, & Kater, 2013; Wang, 2013) .
China declared a plan to introduce ETSs in the late 2011, raising prospects for further engagement with other major Asian economies through a regional carbon trading network.
Seven pilot ETSs have come to operation in the country since 2013 (Han, Olsson, Hallding, & Lunsford, 2012; Jotzo, 2013; Lo, 2012) . The short-term goal is to establish transprovincial and trans-regional ETSs in transition to a national ETS. The prospective national scheme may eventually become the world's second largest after the EU ETS and mark a major step forward in creating a global carbon market at a potentially higher value than the oil market. This has brought some hope to advocates of a common carbon price across the globe.
From the Chinese government's perspective emission trading has multiple benefits.
According to Wang and Duan (2013) , both officially involved in the design of China's ETSs, the emission trading programme can, on the micro-economic level, help minimize the costs of GHG emission reduction, develop new business opportunities, promote business engagement, and establish links with international carbon markets. At a macro-economic level, a successful national ETS will contribute to the transformation to a low-carbon economy and strengthen China's role in international climate change negotiations (Partnership for Market Readiness, 2013; Sun, 2012) .
However, China's carbon pricing policies have been developed in a different political-economic context. The majority of the existing mandatory ETSs operate in mature market economies safeguarded by a liberal democratic regime. In contrast, China is a developing market economy with socialist political legacies (Lo, 2010; Tsang & Kolk, 2010) .
Also it currently does not assume any binding commitment to absolute emissions reduction.
These political realities have created considerable institutional barriers to the development of domestic carbon markets in China.
This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints, and discusses the main challenges to the development of carbon markets in China. It is based on an extensive review of official policy documents, published research papers, and relevant news reports. The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. The first one describes the context of carbon trading, followed by an elaboration on the national policy context in which China's carbon market and pilot ETSs are situated. The third explains the structural hurdles to the development of domestic carbon markets. Implications are discussed in the conclusion.
The political-economic context of carbon trading
The EU ETS is the world's largest carbon market, which is worth US$148 billion and has entered Phase III (2013-2020) of its implementation. Outside Europe, progress has also been made in the Anglo-American world, with ETSs emerging in New Zealand, Australia, California and ten Northeastern states of the U.S., British Columbia and Quebec (Canada).
Carbon markets have become popular because they have enabled the formation of business alliances favouring GHG emissions reductions and enabled businesses to imagine a cycle of investments, profits, and growth centered on these markets. These markets offer a new avenue for economic growth operating by re-organising the role and power of the state (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Newell & Paterson, 2010) .
It is widely believed that carbon markets are established in the liberal-capitalist world as a product of a coalition of financial, political, and environmental actors (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Paterson 2010 Paterson , 2012 . The political momentum for carbon trading was driven by government bodies forming powerful allies with major industries. In particular, some transnational oil giants and the financial sector formed advocacy groups and significantly influenced governments' decisions to introduce ETSs in Europe and the U.S. (Meckling, 2011; Newell and Paterson 2010) . The advocacy coalition manifested as a bottom-up force driving the process of market construction (Meckling, 2011; Paterson, 2010 Paterson, , 2012 . Compatible norms of liberal market economic are pivotal to the market success.
The broader political economic context within which China's carbon markets gain force varies from those of the established liberal-capitalist regimes. The country does not have a long history of neoliberalization of environmental policy and the state machinery is not designed to run market mechanisms (Gilley, 2012; Lo, 2013) . China has formally embraced the notion of "socialist market economy" since its 14 th National Congress held in 1992. The post-Mao market reforms have seen the state retaining substantial control over critical industries, commodity markets, and the economy generally. Political power is largely centralized, particularly in the formulation of national climate change policies, whereas the influence of non-state actors remains peripheral. The authoritative governing practice could undermine the capacity of decentralised economic and market institutions to support the use of market-based policy instruments for mitigating environmental impacts. (Christoff, 2010) . China was blamed for failing to assume tougher emission reduction targets and for not working in meaningful ways with the international community.
Nonetheless, China has made some progress back home (Jiang, Zhuang, Miao, & He, 2013; Zhang, 2007 Zhang, , 2011 . As the world's leader in renewable energy production (Schroeder, 2009) , carbon intensity has declined over the last two decades, although this came with rapid growth in CO 2 emissions per capita (Figure 1 (Lo, 2010; Tsang and Kolk, 2010) . Climate change impacts are understood primarily in macro-economic terms (Sautter, 2009 ).
Second, China remains a planned economy in some aspects, despite the tendency of decentralisation in environmental policy-making (Mol, 2009 however, involved an extended use of the 'visible hand', i.e. political intervention, such as electricity rationing (Wu, 2011) , and formal coercive requirements on energy consumption (Gilley, 2012) . As part of last-ditch efforts to meet the target, a number of provinces were forced to close large swathes of industrial capacity, resulting in "black-outs" of some industries and certain cities towards the end of 2010 (Gilley, 2012; Han et al., 2012) . The marginal success came with high costs.
This experience prompted the central government to seek a different strategy.
Economic policy instruments immediately received attention from senior government officials. Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade mechanisms are prime examples of these instruments being put under serious consideration by the central government.
Tax or trading? Or both?
Carbon trading entered an uncertain period in 2009, when the world economy stumbled and the Copenhagen Conference failed to produce substantive agreements on Post-2012 commitments (Perdan and Azapagic, 2011) . As the world economy began to recover from the financial turmoil, China cast a vote of confidence for the carbon market. Towards the end of 2010, senior Chinese officials declared their ambition to establish a national ETS to curtail its growing GHG output. In October 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's top economic planning agency, granted official approval to seven carbon trading pilot projects.
However, carbon taxes were actually the first preference (Wu, 2011; Han et al., 2012; Yu and Elsworth, 2012) . Carbon taxation was listed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as a promising carbon pricing approach as early as 2007, and several peak government agencies and research institutions were brought together to undertake preliminary research into its feasibility. This policy approach received support from a group of prominent government members and academic economists as a practical option for China in the early stages of its transition to a low-carbon economy in advance of a national ETS (Fan et al., 2011: 40) . A new proposal for a Chinese carbon tax was submitted to the MOF for official consideration in the early 2012, with hopes to roll it out in the second half of the 12 th FYP period, which covers the period of 2011-2015 (Lin & Yang, 2012) . It is worth noting that the carbon tax project is principally coordinated by the MEP, the MOF and other finance agencies, whose influences in the country's climate policy regime are modest.
Carbon taxes are a fiscal measure that harnesses market forces for controlling carbon pollution in ways opposite to carbon trading. Carbon taxes involve setting a fixed price for carbon emissions and allowing the quantity of emissions to fluctuate, whereas carbon trading involves a fixed quantity of emissions and allowing the price of carbon emissions to fluctuate.
Cap-and-trade mechanisms produce efficient outcomes by allowing the market to determine the right price, and are therefore incompatible with carbon taxes which preclude carbon prices from changing. The Chinese government has a choice between the two economic instruments. Pezzey and Jotzo (2013) argue that carbon taxes are a fiscally attractive option for China provided that certain conditions are met. Others, such as Fan et al (2011) and Lin and Yang (2012) , believe that the two policy instruments can co-exist in a given period of time.
While it is possible in theory for carbon taxes and carbon trading to co-exist in a policy mix (Sorrell & Sijm, 2003) , their potential conflicts should not be under-estimated. Carbon taxes, however, are primarily a domestic policy measure restricted to the implementing country.
Such mechanisms could not support China's growing desires for engaging in international or regional climate change policy regimes, such as the EU ETS or potentially its Asia-Pacific equivalent. In contrast, trading mechanisms allow international linking and can enhance the scale of domestic carbon markets and China's capacity for engaging in the governance of international carbon markets. Carbon trading has greater global political and economic implications and therefore proven to be a preferred option being given higher political priority than the idea of carbon tax, which has only received scholarly appreciation and ministerial consideration. in Shenzhen, but market transactions, by volume of treading, were concentrated in in the southern region (i.e. Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Shanghai) (Wang, 2014) . The short-term goal of this policy programme is to establish trans-provincial and trans-regional ETS in transition to a national scheme. The timeframe for the national ETS has moved from 2015/2016 to 2018 (S. Wang, 2014) .
[ China's success on the carbon trading front. These challenges are explained in the next section.
4.
Structural constraints on the development of domestic carbon market 'Cap and trade' mechanisms are driven by formal regulations and/or voluntary business commitments. In addition, they require a robust regulatory and legal framework and a liberal market economy to produce efficient outcomes. The Chinese carbon market falls short of the basic requirements and fails to play a functional role. The Chinese experience is characterised by inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention.
Inadequate domestic demand
Adequate market demand is essential when building a functioning carbon market. It can be driven by a binding emission cap which puts a limit on the amount of GHG emissions that firms are allowed produce, or by their own voluntary commitment to cutting emissions. Such an absolute emission cap has not been introduced in China, while the market demand driven by current carbon intensity reduction targets is not strong enough to support the new industry.
Since China is not subject to legally binding emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol, the central government lacks motivatation to cap GHG emissions at a national level.
The absence of emission caps has created weak demand for emission allowances or offsets (Han et al., 2012; Yu & Elsworth, 2012) . Domestic carbon trades have been predominantly driven by voluntary commitments. However, Chinese firms are under no obligation to hold carbon emissions credits for the pollution they produce, except for those now being covered by the pilot ETSs, which are by no means driven by any Kyoto-based emission target. Not many Chinese firms are motivated to purchase emission reduction credits to fulfil their corporate social responsibility and the majority lack motivation to act (Huang, 2013) . The lack of expertise and capacity has also discouraged corporate participation in global carbon trading (Wang & Pan, 2009 ).
China is a net exporter of emission reduction credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol, -a modern 'gold rush'. As noted by Liu (2010) , carbon trading activities in China remain patchy and, until recently, there was no dedicated authority to coordinate these activities.
There are more sellers than buyers in these markets due to weak domestic demand and strong incentives to sell emission reductions abroad. This is particularly true for smaller exchanges Given the shortage of trading opportunities these carbon markets only play a peripheral role. They merely demonstrate the political efforts of local government leaders competing to showcase their achievements, and operate as a platform for organising public relations and research-and-development activities (Han et al., 2012) . These fragmented markets are not functioning, although they help build capacity for supporting major developments in the national carbon market. The absence of emissions caps has severely limited their vibrancy.
Limited Involvement by Private Finance
Commercial financial services are a critical element of a functioning and efficient carbon market (Bayon, Hawn, & Hamilton, 2009 ). In China, however, economic and financial institutions 'have virtually no role to play in advancing environmental interests' (Mol, 2006, p. 52) . Mol (2006) suggests that these institutions feel no pressure or see any market opportunity from active engagement. This view accurately describes the current situation of climate finance and carbon trading in China specifically.
According to the 2012 China Climate Finance Report, public funds currently dominate the total investment in climate finance in China (Wang et al., 2012;  (Grubb et al., 2011; Stadelmann, Michaelowa, & Roberts, 2013 Carbon trading is a more specific area of climate finance that requires a functioning market to deliver efficient outcomes. The regulatory and policy environment is, again, the key determinant of success or failure. According to Adams (2013) , the central government forbade Chinese banks and certain other financial institutions from getting involved in the CDM and appears reticent to allow them to participate in the China's domestic carbon markets. Securities regulators do not view carbon trading as falling under the purview of 'finance' and tend not to assume direct responsibility for regulating carbon markets (Adams, 2013) . Indeed, there has been 'a culture of distrust in business', limiting access of some corporations and financiers interested in carbon trading to the policy arenas (Wang, 2013, p. 273) . Carbon asset management firms, for instance, have no significant impact on the institutional development of Chinese voluntary carbon markets. Neither the central nor local governments consider these firms indispensable components of domestic carbon trading systems (Huang, 2013) .
The market structure in its current form does not appear attractive to businesses and financial institutions. Few Chinese businesses take corporate social responsibility seriously and they have no legal obligations to curb their emissions. This leads to low demand for carbon credits and related financial services. On the supply side, Chinese carbon exchanges are currently only allowed to operate spot markets. Globally, these markets account for only a small share of the carbon trades, whereas futures markets dominate (Wang et al., 2012) . For carbon trading to thrive, exchanges must have the capacity to allow derivatives trading and securities businesses, but the central government is reluctant to offer derivatives and securities because of risk-management concerns (Adams, 2013) . As specified in a decree released in 2011 (State Council, 2011) , special permissions are required for local exchanges to undertake these activities. The limited trading options are likely to discourage financial investors.
Incomplete regulatory infrastructure
Compliance carbon markets are regulation-driven. Under an ETS, firms are required to surrender emission permits for a given amount of emissions produced. Legislation is imperative to establishing the legal status of emission permits or allowances. Enforcement and punishment are required in the event of non-compliance or misconduct, where permits are not surrendered as stipulated, prescribed trading rules are violated, or data reporting is found to be misleading. Moreover, the number of permits a firm has to hold is assessed against available emissions data. An accurate and consistent system for measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification is essential to ensure effective regulation of firms covered by an ETS.
China's regulatory infrastructure for carbon trading is far from complete. There are considerable challenges in setting up robust monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms, which remain current in Europe and more so in China, where legal enforcement is constantly a problem confronting all levels of the society. Currently, there are no national regulations specifically for emission trading, and the on-going ETS programme proceeds as an administrative operation. While any assessment of regulatory performance in advance of the implementation of the pilot schemes is inevitably inconclusive, it is useful to review other relevant regulatory experiences as a reference point, such as the SO 2 ETS.
The notion of SO 2 emission trading has been in China since the 1990s. Although local governments had set up regulations for the SO 2 ETSs, the lack of transparency in actual regulatory practice remains a concern. Emission trading rules are not clearly articulated, and enterprises have little assurance that the trading arrangements could protect their rights as 'under-the-table' negotiations and corruptions dominate (Tao & Mah, 2009 ). Market transparency is also limited due to the absence of an effective information management and disclosure system (Tao and Mah, 2009 ). Furthermore, the punitive mechanisms are poorly constructed; fines are too low to discourage non-compliance (Chang & Wang, 2010; Mol, 2009 ). Violation for the second time is tolerated: a firm would not be fined twice for the same polluting activity in the event of non-compliance, consequently creating little motivation for buying or selling emission permits (Chang and Wang 2010) . Locally there is strong political resistance to the enforcement of environmental laws, including those relating to emission caps that are thought to be detrimental to the economy (Liu & Xu, 2012; Zhang, 2007) . Bureaucrats generally have low motivation to consistently enforce legal provisions.
Allocation of emission permits would be a source of faults if monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms lack accuracy and consistency. This is the current situation in China, where official emissions data lack reliability (Zhang, 2011) and the current systems are predominantly based on self-reporting (Tao and Mah, 2009; Chang and Wang, 2010) .
Regulated firms prepare emissions reports themselves and are subject to occasional inspections by environmental agencies. They are only required to report fuel inputs and emissions are not monitored on a regular basis, if ever. Manipulation of emission data is not uncommon under some allocation methods (Tao and Mah, 2009) . Permit allocation remains arbitrary in the absence of reliable information on which it is based. China is not known for effective legal enforcement and disclosure of sensitive environmental information (Mol, He, & Zhang, 2011) .
Excessive state intervention
The promise of economic efficiency relies upon the existence of a perfectly functioning market. A necessary condition for an ETS to work is that prices are allowed to fluctuate towards market equilibrium. The idealised setting is a free market economy in which prices are determined by market dynamic and not controlled by a single party. This economic assumption has lost validity in actual market settings (Spash & Lo, 2012) . The European experience suggests that market power does exist and the power industry, often dominated by a handful of large corporations, has the ability to engage in activities such as mark-up pricing, price discrimination and manipulation (Spash & Lo, 2012) . There are large variations in the regulated prices between or even within plants. The regulation of wholesale electricity price proves to be ineffective (Du et al., 2009) . Criteria for price control have been arbitrary.
Price control means that the carbon price under the ETS would reflect political judgement, rather than marginal cost of production. Regulated electricity companies would be prevented from passing the full cost to electricity users who are expected to adjust their power consumption in response to price signals, as the central government is highly concerned about the impacts of volatile prices on the economy, particularly the possibility of inflation under the carbon price (Wu, 2011) . A World Bank report predicts that under a Chinese ETS which covers the power industry, the Department of Price would play a central role in managing the cost of carbon and its fluctuation (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012) . The managed carbon price would effectively become a kind of carbon tax in co-existence with a cap-and-trade mechanism, in which both prices and emissions quantity are subject to some form of state control. Prospects for economic efficiency are, however, uncertain (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003) .
The regulatory experience with the Chinese SO 2 ETS has demonstrated the limited scope for the market to operate free from arbitrary political manipulation. The SO 2 emission trade prices are largely modulated or instructed by the state depending on the discretion of individual government officials (Tao and Mah, 2009) . Emission trading transactions have been subject to administrative intervention. In some cases the government dominates the entire transaction process, including negotiation on trading price, trading volume and terms of permit ownership (Tao and Mah, 2009) . Market competition has only recently come to existence in China's regulated power sector in which political bargaining is prevalent. The legacy of planned economy has created distortions to the ETS.
Given the tremendous economic implications of GHG control, the central and local governments are tempted to execute the 'visible hand' by modulating prices as they do regularly to manage the economy. It is therefore uncertain as to how the power sector can be brought into the prospective ETS. Certainly some form of policy intervention is occasionally needed to manage residual risks and maintain market order, but the Chinese government has a history of regularly and intensively controlling the macro-economy through administrative means. Gilley (2012) has noted that a key element of China's climate policy discourse is the extensive use of authoritative power. This governance tradition comes into conflict with the theoretical requirements for an emission trading regime to operate efficiently.
Conclusions
China has made efforts on emission reduction in the context of continuing economic development. The conditional commitment is evidenced by the declared preference for intensity targets and compatible economic mechanisms recently adopted. Carbon taxes could fit the domestic context, whereas domestic carbon trading in early stages lacked coordination and merely served to reap short-term benefits and improve public image without demonstrating major environmental achievements. However, carbon trading has proved to be politically more attractive. High-level coordination is underway and centrally approved ETSs are up and running. Political resistance has softened; local emissions caps are being introduced and national caps are imaginable in medium term. The real challenges are, however, how the regulation-driven carbon market system works effectively with the state machinery which is not primarily designed to support such system.
China's carbon markets operate in a unique political economic context that accounts for some of the structural barriers limiting their growth. This article has identified four main challenges to the carbon market development in China, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure and excessive government intervention. The first two concern economic dimensions. A key hurdle underlying these economic challenges is the absence of a nationwide emission cap.
Nevertheless, Chinese state leaders appear to be increasingly aware of the potential benefits of active engagement in global carbon trading, as demonstrated by their approval of the pilot
ETSs. There will be long-term benefits to the country if carbon trades eventually surpass the oil market and dominate the global market. In addition to mounting international pressures, the fact that China's economic growth and energy demand have begun to slow down in recent years may also reduce political resistance to introducing binding emission limits at the national level.
In this light, it is possible that some form of emission cap may come into existence in this country in the next ten years or so, creating demand for emission allowances and giving the necessary economic energy to the domestic carbon market. This can also address, at least partially, the problem of limited financial involvement. When regulated firms are required and motivated to curb emissions or purchase emission allowances or offsets, private financial institutions will become more willing to engage in the carbon market. Banks, financial intermediaries and consultancies will gain experience and capacity over time through pilot schemes and other private or public initiatives. Proper changes in policy arrangements can address the lack of demand and investment which creates impediments to market growth.
Capping GHG emissions at the national level, in particular, will be an effective way for strengthening China's carbon markets.
The other two challenges tend to be institutional and to arise from the unique political system of China, which operates as a 'social market economy'. The lack of a robust regulatory and legal framework, and the excess of government intervention are amongst the more intractable governance issues. Modest changes in governing practice have occurred through the tendency for decentralisation of environmental policy-making. However, some of the institutional barriers are rooted in the ways in which the larger system operates and maintains its legitimacy. For example, improving the regulatory and legal framework for GHG emission reporting will enhance transparency; but it may open up some sensitive energy security issues that the ruling regime has traditionally been very cautious about (official data on provincial and municipal GHG emissions are currently not open to public).
Furthermore, the ability to exercise direct government intervention in the macroeconomy (e.g. moderating utility prices) proves to be important for the non-elected ruling regime to maintain economic and social stability in this country. Political efforts are required to address these deeply entrenched institutional barriers and redefine the role of the state.
Although the ongoing ETS programme will introduce new institutional practices at various scales, the success of China's carbon market reform crucially depends on the ability of these new institutions to transform the distorted state-market relationship. To strengthen the carbon markets, policy-makers should reconsider the role of macro-economic agencies, such as the Department of Price, and state ownership of big GHG emitters, notably oil companies.
Further research is needed to ascertain how the state and the market interact to balance conflicting political and economic requirements.
